Accepted Papers

  • Omer Ben-Porat and Moshe Tennenholtz.
    Multi-Unit Facility Location Games

  • Vincent Conitzer.
    Computing Equilibria with Partial Commitment

  • Kira Goldner and Anna R. Karlin.
    A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive Bidders

  • Swaprava Nath and Tuomas Sandholm.
    Efficiency and Budget Balance

  • Susanne Albers and Dennis Kraft.
    Motivating Time-Inconsistent Agents: A Computational Approach

  • Rad Niazadeh and Christopher Wilkens.
    Competitive Equilibria for Non-quasilinear Bidders in Combinatorial Auctions

  • Piotr Skowron.
    FPT Approximation Schemes for Maximizing Submodular Functions

  • Dimitris Fotakis, Laurent Gourves and Jerome Monnot.
    Conference Program Design with Single-Peaked and Single-Crossing Preferences

  • Artur Czumaj, Argyrios Deligkas, Michail Fasoulakis, John Fearnley, Marcin Jurdzinkski and Rahul Savani.
    Distributed Methods for Computing Approximate Equilibria

  • Yuqing Kong, Katrina Ligett and Grant Schoenebeck.
    Putting Peer Prediction Under the Micro(economic)scope and Making Truth-telling Focal

  • Martin Hoefer, Thomas Kesselheim and Bojana Kodric.
    Smoothness for Simultaneous Composition of Mechanisms with Admission

  • Brandon Fain, Ashish Goel and Kamesh Munagala.
    The Core of the Participatory Budgeting Problem

  • Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee and Krishnamurthy Iyer.
    Near-Efficient Allocation using Artificial Currency in Repeated Settings

  • Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier and Noam Nisan.
    Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions

  • Ioannis Caragiannis, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Søren Stiil Frederiksen, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen and Zihan Tan.
    Truthful Facility Assignment with Resource Augmentation: An Exact Analysis of Serial Dictatorship

  • Xiaotie Deng, Zhe Feng and Christos Papadimitriou.
    Power-Law Distributions in a Two-sided Market and Net Neutrality

  • Argyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley and Rahul Savani.
    Inapproximability Results for Approximate Nash Equilibria

  • D. Thirumulanathan, Rajesh Sundaresan and Y Narahari.
    Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Items to a Single Buyer having Uniformly Distributed Valuations

  • Darrell Hoy, Nicole Immorlica and Brendan Lucier.
    On-demand or Spot? Selling the cloud to risk-averse customers

  • Weina Wang, Lei Ying and Junshan Zhang.
    Buying Data from Privacy-Aware Individuals: The Effect of Negative Payments

  • Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Stefano Leonardi and Qiang Zhang.
    Revenue Maximizing Envy-Free Pricing in Matching Markets with Budgets

  • Tobias Brunsch, Michael Etscheid and Heiko Röglin.
    Bounds for the Convergence Time of Local Search in Scheduling Problems

  • Sanjeev Goyal, Shahin Jabbari, Michael Kearns, Sanjeev Khanna and Jamie Morgenstern.
    Strategic Network Formation with Attack and Immunization

  • Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas and Evangelos Markakis.
    Coverage, Matching, and Beyond: New Results on Budgeted Mechanism Design

  • Elliot Anshelevich and Shreyas Sekar.
    Truthful Mechanisms for Matching and Clustering in an Ordinal World

  • Liad Blumrosen and Yehonatan Mizrahi.
    Approximating Gains-from-Trade in Bilateral Trading

  • Hau Chan, Albert Xin Jiang, Kevin Leyton-Brown and Ruta Mehta.
    Multilinear Games

  • Vittorio Bilò, Angelo Fanelli and Luca Moscardelli.
    Opinion Formation Games with Dynamic Social Influences

  • Elliot Anshelevich, Koushik Kar and Shreyas Sekar.
    Pricing to Maximize Revenue and Welfare Simultaneously in Large Markets

  • Christos Tzamos and Christopher Wilkens.
    Anonymous Auctions Maximizing Revenue

  • Aris Anagnostopoulos, Ruggiero Cavallo, Stefano Leonardi and Maxim Sviridenko.
    Bidding Strategies for Fantasy-Sports Auctions

  • Gilles Barthe, Marco Gaboardi, Emilio Jesus Gallego Arias, Justin Hsu, Aaron Roth and Pierre-Yves Strub.
    Computer-aided Verification for Mechanism Design

  • Samuel Haney, Debmalya Panigrahi and Rupert Freeman.
    On the Price of Stability of Undirected Multicast Games

  • Itai Feigenbaum, Yash Kanoria, Irene Lo and Jay Sethuraman.
    The Magician's Shuffle: Reusing Lottery Numbers for School Seat Redistribution

  • Grant Schoenebeck and Fang-Yi Yu.
    Complex Contagions on Configuration Model Graphs with a Power-Law Degree Distribution