![Vishnu V. Narayan](VishnuVNarayan.png)
I am a postdoctoral fellow with the amazing Michal Feldman, and I'm currently on the job market.
I obtained my Ph.D. in Computer Science under the excellent supervision of Adrian Vetta at McGill University, where we worked on analyzing auction equilibria and on fair division. I have an M.Math. degree (Combinatorics and Optimization) from the University of Waterloo, where I was fortunate to be advised by Joseph Cheriyan and where we analyzed approximation algorithms for graph connectivity.
Conference
C10. |
Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations with M. Feldman, S. Mauras, and T. Ponitka EC 2024 |
C9. |
Fair Division via Quantile Shares with Y. Babichenko, M. Feldman, and R. Holzman STOC 2024 [selected for Highlights Beyond EC 2024] |
C8. |
Fair Chore Division Under Binary Supermodular Costs with S. Barman and P. Verma AAMAS 2023 (extended abstract) |
C7. |
Two Birds With One Stone: Fairness and Welfare via Transfers with M. Suzuki and A. Vetta SAGT 2021 |
C6. |
The Speed and Threshold of the Biased Hamilton Cycle Game with N. Brustle, S. Clusiau, N. Ndiaye, B. Reed and B. Seamone LAGOS 2021 |
C5. |
The Speed and Threshold of the Biased Perfect Matching Game with N. Brustle, S. Clusiau, N. Ndiaye, B. Reed and B. Seamone LAGOS 2021 |
C4. |
Online Coloring and a New Type of Adversary for Online Graph Problems with Y. Li and D. Pankratov WAOA 2020 [WAOA'20 talk] |
C3. |
One Dollar Each Eliminates Envy with J. Brustle, J. Dippel, M. Suzuki and A. Vetta EC 2020 [EC'20 talk] |
C2. |
The Declining Price Anomaly is not Universal in Multi-Buyer Sequential Auctions (but almost is) with E. Prebet and A. Vetta SAGT 2019 [Best Paper Award] |
C1. |
Risk-Free Bidding in Complement-Free Combinatorial Auctions with G. Rayaprolu and A. Vetta SAGT 2019 |
Journal
J5. |
The Speed and Threshold of the Biased Perfect Matching and Hamilton Cycle Games with N. Brustle, S. Clusiau, N. Ndiaye, B. Reed and B. Seamone Discrete Applied Mathematics (2023) Supersedes C5 and C6 |
J4. |
Online Coloring and a New Type of Adversary for Online Graph Problems with Y. Li and D. Pankratov Algorithmica (2022) Supersedes C4 |
J3. |
The Declining Price Anomaly is not Universal in Multi-Buyer Sequential Auctions (but almost is) with E. Prebet and A. Vetta Theory of Computing Systems (2022) Supersedes C2 |
J2. |
Risk-Free Bidding in Complement-Free Combinatorial Auctions with G. Rayaprolu and A. Vetta Theory of Computing Systems (2022) Supersedes C1 |
J1. |
The Matching Augmentation Problem: A 7/4-Approximation Algorithm with J. Cheriyan, J. Dippel, F. Grandoni and A. Khan Mathematical Programming (2020) |
Thesis
T2. |
Multi-item Auctions and Fair Division Ph.D. Thesis, McGill University (2022) |
T1. |
Approximating Minimum-Size 2-Edge-Connected and 2-Vertex-Connected Spanning Subgraphs M.Math. Thesis, University of Waterloo (2017) |