Vishnu V. Narayan

CV   //   first.last at mail.mcgill.ca

Vishnu V. Narayan

I am a postdoctoral fellow with the amazing Michal Feldman, and I'm currently on the job market.

I obtained my Ph.D. in Computer Science under the excellent supervision of Adrian Vetta at McGill University, where we worked on analyzing auction equilibria and on fair division. I have an M.Math. degree (Combinatorics and Optimization) from the University of Waterloo, where I was fortunate to be advised by Joseph Cheriyan and where we analyzed approximation algorithms for graph connectivity.

Conference

C10. Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations
with M. Feldman, S. Mauras, and T. Ponitka
EC 2024
C9. Fair Division via Quantile Shares
with Y. Babichenko, M. Feldman, and R. Holzman
STOC 2024  [selected for Highlights Beyond EC 2024]
C8. Fair Chore Division Under Binary Supermodular Costs
with S. Barman and P. Verma
AAMAS 2023 (extended abstract)
C7. Two Birds With One Stone: Fairness and Welfare via Transfers
with M. Suzuki and A. Vetta
SAGT 2021
C6. The Speed and Threshold of the Biased Hamilton Cycle Game
with N. Brustle, S. Clusiau, N. Ndiaye, B. Reed and B. Seamone
LAGOS 2021
C5. The Speed and Threshold of the Biased Perfect Matching Game
with N. Brustle, S. Clusiau, N. Ndiaye, B. Reed and B. Seamone
LAGOS 2021
C4. Online Coloring and a New Type of Adversary for Online Graph Problems
with Y. Li and D. Pankratov
WAOA 2020  [WAOA'20 talk]
C3. One Dollar Each Eliminates Envy
with J. Brustle, J. Dippel, M. Suzuki and A. Vetta
EC 2020  [EC'20 talk]
C2. The Declining Price Anomaly is not Universal in Multi-Buyer Sequential Auctions (but almost is)
with E. Prebet and A. Vetta
SAGT 2019 [Best Paper Award]
C1. Risk-Free Bidding in Complement-Free Combinatorial Auctions
with G. Rayaprolu and A. Vetta
SAGT 2019

Journal

J5. The Speed and Threshold of the Biased Perfect Matching and Hamilton Cycle Games
with N. Brustle, S. Clusiau, N. Ndiaye, B. Reed and B. Seamone
Discrete Applied Mathematics (2023)
Supersedes C5 and C6
J4. Online Coloring and a New Type of Adversary for Online Graph Problems
with Y. Li and D. Pankratov
Algorithmica (2022)
Supersedes C4
J3. The Declining Price Anomaly is not Universal in Multi-Buyer Sequential Auctions (but almost is)
with E. Prebet and A. Vetta
Theory of Computing Systems (2022)
Supersedes C2
J2. Risk-Free Bidding in Complement-Free Combinatorial Auctions
with G. Rayaprolu and A. Vetta
Theory of Computing Systems (2022)
Supersedes C1
J1. The Matching Augmentation Problem: A 7/4-Approximation Algorithm
with J. Cheriyan, J. Dippel, F. Grandoni and A. Khan
Mathematical Programming (2020)

Thesis

T2. Multi-item Auctions and Fair Division
Ph.D. Thesis, McGill University (2022)
T1. Approximating Minimum-Size 2-Edge-Connected and 2-Vertex-Connected Spanning Subgraphs
M.Math. Thesis, University of Waterloo (2017)