Omer Ben-Porat and Moshe Tennenholtz.
Multi-Unit Facility Location Games
Computing Equilibria with Partial Commitment
Kira Goldner and Anna R. Karlin.
A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive Bidders
Swaprava Nath and Tuomas Sandholm.
Efficiency and Budget Balance
Susanne Albers and Dennis Kraft.
Motivating Time-Inconsistent Agents: A Computational Approach
Rad Niazadeh and Christopher Wilkens.
Competitive Equilibria for Non-quasilinear Bidders in Combinatorial Auctions
FPT Approximation Schemes for Maximizing Submodular Functions
Dimitris Fotakis, Laurent Gourves and Jerome Monnot.
Conference Program Design with Single-Peaked and Single-Crossing Preferences
Artur Czumaj, Argyrios Deligkas, Michail Fasoulakis, John Fearnley, Marcin Jurdzinkski and Rahul Savani.
Distributed Methods for Computing Approximate Equilibria
Yuqing Kong, Katrina Ligett and Grant Schoenebeck.
Putting Peer Prediction Under the Micro(economic)scope and Making Truth-telling Focal
Martin Hoefer, Thomas Kesselheim and Bojana Kodric.
Smoothness for Simultaneous Composition of Mechanisms with Admission
Brandon Fain, Ashish Goel and Kamesh Munagala.
The Core of the Participatory Budgeting Problem
Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee and Krishnamurthy Iyer.
Near-Efficient Allocation using Artificial Currency in Repeated Settings
Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier and Noam Nisan.
Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions
Ioannis Caragiannis, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Søren Stiil Frederiksen, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen and Zihan Tan.
Truthful Facility Assignment with Resource Augmentation: An Exact Analysis of Serial Dictatorship
Xiaotie Deng, Zhe Feng and Christos Papadimitriou.
Power-Law Distributions in a Two-sided Market and Net Neutrality
Argyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley and Rahul Savani.
Inapproximability Results for Approximate Nash Equilibria
D. Thirumulanathan, Rajesh Sundaresan and Y Narahari.
Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Items to a Single Buyer having Uniformly Distributed Valuations
Darrell Hoy, Nicole Immorlica and Brendan Lucier.
On-demand or Spot? Selling the cloud to risk-averse customers
Weina Wang, Lei Ying and Junshan Zhang.
Buying Data from Privacy-Aware Individuals: The Effect of Negative Payments
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Stefano Leonardi and Qiang Zhang.
Revenue Maximizing Envy-Free Pricing in Matching Markets with Budgets
Tobias Brunsch, Michael Etscheid and Heiko Röglin.
Bounds for the Convergence Time of Local Search in Scheduling Problems
Sanjeev Goyal, Shahin Jabbari, Michael Kearns, Sanjeev Khanna and Jamie Morgenstern.
Strategic Network Formation with Attack and Immunization
Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas and Evangelos Markakis.
Coverage, Matching, and Beyond: New Results on Budgeted Mechanism Design
Elliot Anshelevich and Shreyas Sekar.
Truthful Mechanisms for Matching and Clustering in an Ordinal World
Liad Blumrosen and Yehonatan Mizrahi.
Approximating Gains-from-Trade in Bilateral Trading
Hau Chan, Albert Xin Jiang, Kevin Leyton-Brown and Ruta Mehta.
Vittorio Bilò, Angelo Fanelli and Luca Moscardelli.
Opinion Formation Games with Dynamic Social Influences
Elliot Anshelevich, Koushik Kar and Shreyas Sekar.
Pricing to Maximize Revenue and Welfare Simultaneously in Large Markets
Christos Tzamos and Christopher Wilkens.
Anonymous Auctions Maximizing Revenue
Aris Anagnostopoulos, Ruggiero Cavallo, Stefano Leonardi and Maxim Sviridenko.
Bidding Strategies for Fantasy-Sports Auctions
Gilles Barthe, Marco Gaboardi, Emilio Jesus Gallego Arias, Justin Hsu, Aaron Roth and Pierre-Yves Strub.
Computer-aided Verification for Mechanism Design
Samuel Haney, Debmalya Panigrahi and Rupert Freeman.
On the Price of Stability of Undirected Multicast Games
Itai Feigenbaum, Yash Kanoria, Irene Lo and Jay Sethuraman.
The Magician's Shuffle: Reusing Lottery Numbers for School Seat Redistribution
Grant Schoenebeck and Fang-Yi Yu.
Complex Contagions on Configuration Model Graphs with a Power-Law Degree Distribution